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11 Introduction
The last years have witnessed a notedly rising interest in natural resource scarcity and
its long-run economic consequences. In the framework of capital-resource models, sev-
eral papers have shown that long-run endogenous growth may be compatible with the
essential use of non-renewable resources, see Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999),
and Grimaud and Roug´ e (2003, 2005). This literature has analyzed the eﬀects of endoge-
nous technological change in a framework with a single ﬁnal output. This assumption
is convenient but sidesteps the possibility of analyzing sectoral composition of output
and its impact on long-run development. There are strong reasons to assume a high
relevance of sectoral structure in this context. First, empirical observations show that
sectors diﬀer substantially in terms of input intensities, speciﬁcally with regard to knowl-
edge and natural resource use. Second, sectors oﬀer diﬀerent investment opportunities
with aggregate growth depending on sectoral development and sector-speciﬁc innovation
intensities. Third, policies directed at speciﬁc sectors are very popular and often imple-
mented in practice. For these reasons, the impact of sectoral heterogeneity on growth
emerges as a major issue, in particular when focusing on endogenous innovations, natural
resource constraints, and policy.
The aim of this paper is to study the dynamic behavior of economies in which sectoral
outputs are characterized by diﬀerent resource intensities. We stress the role of sectoral
research activities and directed technological change. By doing so, we apply the theory of
factor-induced technical change, as introduced by Hicks (1932) and applied by Acemoglu
(2002), to economic sectors and determine the conditions for sector-induced research. We
show that long-run development is characterized by speciﬁc regularities for the direction
of R&D and the composition of sectoral outputs. We analyze diﬀerent types of policies
employed by governments to foster sustainable development in the sense of reallocating
inputs towards less resource intensive sectors, enhancing growth and reducing the speed
of resource extraction. Examples include sectoral policies, e.g. subsidies or productive
public good provision to resource extensive sectors, but also resource taxes. It is shown
that these policies might not induce the desired eﬀects or that the sectors to which
policies are linked do not matter for the direction of policy eﬀects.
The fact that, in practice, sectoral resource eﬃciency and energy-related research
have recently gained in importance, may be illustrated by two examples. In the light of
rapidly rising energy prices, the International Energy Agency (IEA) emphasizes the large
potential for improving energy eﬃciency in the energy-intensive sectors, in all of which
(apart from the cement industry) energy intensity is predicted to improve signiﬁcantly
(see IEA 2008, p. 112). The impact of energy prices on innovation activities can be
illustrated with the example of Hungary, one of the few countries providing detailed
2research data: from 2001 to 2005 ﬁrms’ research expenditures in the ﬁeld of energy
(rational utilization, production, and distribution) increased by 300% while total research
expenditures rose only by 48% (see OECD 2008).
The paper is related to the literature on sectoral change and sectoral reallocations
that follow speciﬁc regularities. The most prominent example is the reallocation of labor
from agriculture to manufacturing and services that has been pointed out by, among oth-
ers, Kuznets (1957) and Chenery (1960). Recently, these regularities - often summarized
under the term ‘Kuznets’ facts’ (to complement the well-known ‘Kaldor facts’) - have
attracted renewed interest in the debate on non-balanced growth, see Kongsamut et al.
(2001) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). Including natural resources, L´ opez et al.
(2007) emphasize that sectoral change is a major issue when asking whether growth is
sustainable in the long run. With the expected increase in resource prices in the future it
seems natural to predict that resource-intensive sectors will grow below average and their
share of total production will shrink over time. The results of this paper clarify why,
when, and how sector-speciﬁc technical change can compensate for high resource depen-
dence and how it aﬀects long-run growth. We ﬁnd, that due to resource scarcity, the
quantities of goods produced in resource-intensive sectors fall compared to production
in more resource-extensive sectors. Yet, due to the rising scarcity of resource-intensive
goods, incentives arise to invest relatively more in R&D of the resource-intensive sec-
tor. Consequently, the composition of consumption in terms of productivity-weighted
sectoral goods remains constant along a balanced growth path.
The basic technology assumptions for the diﬀerent sectors in the model are based
on Romer (1990). This is similar to Bretschger and Pittel (2005) who consider a multi-
sector economy with sector-speciﬁc natural resource use but without directed techno-
logical change, as the substitution elasticity between sectoral outputs is assumed to be
unity.1 Of the recent literature on directed technological change, Smulders and de Nooij
(2003) and Di Maria and Valente (2008) are closest to our approach. These papers do
not assume that natural resources and labor are employed in all the diﬀerent sectors
of the economy as we do. Smulders and de Nooij (2003) take the supply of energy as
exogenously given. We extend their approach by endogenizing the dynamics associated
with the input of non-renewable natural resources. Moreover, we introduce labor reallo-
cation between the diﬀerent production and research sectors, which realistically allows
for more ﬂexible adjustments in the economy. Due to this endogeneity, policies can now
aﬀect the speed of resource extraction as well as aggregate research activities - both
of which are crucial for the dynamics of the economy. Di Maria and Valente (2008)
1Withagen (1999), Pittel (2002), and Xepapadeas (2002) provide surveys on the impact of natural
resource use on economic growth. The impact of natural resource use in dynamic multi-sector models is
also treated by Peretto (2008) and Bretschger (2008).
3endogenize the supply of inputs, capital and resources, but again do not assume that
all inputs are used in the diﬀerent sectors. They conclude that long-run development is
characterized by resource-augmenting technological progress only. For the case that the
economic sectors employ all the inputs and only diﬀer with respect to input intensities
we are able to show that every sector conducts R&D in the long-run. The direction
of technological change is endogenous and depends on the degree of heterogeneity with
respect to resource intensities.
We show the existence of a balanced growth path and provide conditions for saddle-
path stability of the system. In addition, we demonstrate that the share of resource-
intensive sectors can be constant in the long-run as proﬁt incentives induce a more than
proportional research eﬀort to these sectors. We also show that in an economy with
heterogenous sectors, research subsidies have positive growth eﬀects in both sectors and
that resource taxes aﬀect dynamics only when the tax rate is varying over time. The
provision of productive services by the government raises the growth rate, provided the
quantity of services is steadily extended.
The paper introduces several novel features. First, it introduces a new kind of multi-
sector economy suited to discuss the direction of development under natural resource con-
straints. Second, it derives basic characteristics of growth paths of two-sector economies
with essential non-renewable resources and directed technical change. Third, we study
implications of diﬀerent types of policies that aim at supporting sustainability. In addi-
tion to taxes and subsidies, we consider the impact that productivity enhancing public
goods have on growth, sectoral shares and resource extraction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model in
detail. The short and long-run dynamics of the model are analyzed in Section 3. Section
4 deals with the eﬀects of policies striving at abetting sustainability in this simpliﬁed
setting. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In our economy, horizontally diﬀerentiated goods are produced in two sectors – a resource-
intensive and a resource-extensive sector. In each sector, the diﬀerentiated goods are
assembled to sectoral outputs which are consumed by the households. Blueprints for
new products are developed by sector speciﬁc research activities and sold to monopo-
listic producers in each sector. Besides natural resources, labor constitutes the second
primary input, which is employed in research as well as in intermediate production. Sec-
tors diﬀer with respect to resource intensity of production. We consider inﬁnitely living
households that maximize lifetime utility. Savings are either in the form of investment
in bonds or in R&D.
42.1 Production
Sectoral output The outputs of the two sectors, ˜ X and ˜ Z, each consist of a continuum
of horizontally diﬀerentiated goods, xi, i ∈ [0,n], and zj, j ∈ [0,m], where n and m
denote the number of varieties in the respective sectors.2 Gains from specialization
arise, i.e. the larger the variety of goods, the more productive the aggregate:3
˜ X =
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where 0 < β < 1. The index of consumption C reﬂects households’ preferences for












, ν > 0, ν  = 1 (2)
where ν denotes the elasticity of substitution between ˜ X and ˜ Z. To facilitate calculations
without loss of generality, we choose the consumption good to be the numeraire of the
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C and 1 − φ =
p ˜ Z
˜ Z
C denoting the expenditure shares of ˜ X and ˜ Z, such that
the relative sector share of x-goods is given by ˜ φ, which will prove to be a very useful
variable below.
Competition in x- and z-production is monopolistic. Each type of good is pro-
duced by only one ﬁrm that has to acquire the according patent ﬁrst. x- as well as
z-intermediates are produced from labor L and non-renewable resources R using the
following Cobb-Douglas production technologies:
xi = (Lxi)
α (Rxi)
1−α and zj =
 
Lzj
 δ  
Rzj
 1−δ (4)
with 0 < α,δ < 1. Lk and Rk, k = xi,zj, denote the input of labor and resources in the
production of xi and zj. It is assumed that sectors diﬀer with respect to their resource
intensities, i.e. α  = δ.
2For notational convenience the time index will be suppressed whenever no ambiguity arises.
3In contrast to the productivity adjusted aggregates, ˜ X and ˜ Z, we denote aggregate physical amounts
of xi and zi by X =
R n
0 xidi and Z =
R m
0 zjdj. The prices for ˜ X and ˜ Z are p ˜ X and p ˜ Z. pxi and pzi on
the other hand denote prices for individual goods.
5Maximization of proﬁts gives the ﬁrst-order conditions for the input of labor and
resources in the two sectors. Considering that xi = x and zj = z in the symmetric
equilibrium gives the sectoral demands for labor and resources in terms of ˜ φ and C:
LX = αβ
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
w
and LZ = δβ
1
1 + ˜ φ
C
w
RX = (1 − α)β
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
pR
and RZ = (1 − δ)β
1






0 Rkdi and LK =
  l
0 Lkdj, (K,l,k) ∈ (X,n,xi),(Z,m,zj). w and pR
denote the wage rate and the price of resources. Individual ﬁrms’ demands are obtained
by dividing the respective sectoral demands by the ‘number’ of intermediates in each
sector, i.e. n and m respectively. Summing up the resource demands of the two sectors
in (5) gives the aggregate extraction of resources at each point in time:
R = RX + RZ = ((1 − α)˜ φ + (1 − δ))
β




From (5) and the production functions for x and z, (4), sectoral equilibrium proﬁts
from intermediates production can be derived:
ΠX = (1 − β)
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C and ΠZ = (1 − β)
1
1 + ˜ φ
C. (7)
R&D Blueprints for new types of goods are generated in two separate R&D sectors.
The only rival input to research is labor, yet production also proﬁts from past research
activities which give rise to positive sector speciﬁc spill-overs. Production is linear in
labor as well as in research experience which is, for simplicity, set equal to the ‘number’















with Ln and Lm denoting the input of labor to sectoral research. a represents the unit
input coeﬃcient of labor in research which is assumed to be equal in the two sectors.
Given the four diﬀerent uses of labor, equilibrium in the labor market requires
LX + LZ + Ln + Lm = 1. (9)
where, for simplicity, the size of the labor force is normalized to unity.
Research markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, such that in equilibrium








6Furthermore, equilibrium on the patent market requires the value of a patent to be
equal to the discounted stream of proﬁts generated by the production of the respective
intermediate good which implies the following no-arbitrage conditions to hold:
˙ Vn = rVn − Πx and ˙ Vm = rVm − Πz (11)
where r is the interest rate on all assets. Πx = ΠX
n and Πz = ΠZ
m stand for individual
intermediate ﬁrms’ proﬁts; ΠX and ΠZ are given in (7).
Resources Natural resources are non-renewable. The resource stock S is depleted by
the extraction of resources R for production, such that the dynamics of the resource
stock are
˙ S = −R. (12)















Households derive utility from consumption C. The representative household maximizes






s.t. ˙ W = rW + w − C
where W = nVn+mVm+pRS denotes total household asset holdings. Households supply
labor inelastically. From the ﬁrst-order conditions of household maximization we get the
familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule
gC = r − ρ. (16)
3 Development in the short and long run
To analyze the dynamics of the economy we reduce the system to two ﬁrst-order dif-
ferential equations which are functions of the relative sector share, ˜ φ, and the input of
labor in intermediates production of sector z, i.e. LZ.
4gb denotes the growth rate of variable b, i.e. gb =
˙ b
b, where ˙ b is the time derivative of b.
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Proof. see Appendix A1.
These two equations describe the dynamics of the system along the balanced growth
path (BGP) as well as during the transition to the BGP.
3.1 Balanced growth path
A path will be called a BGP if all variables grow at constant – possibly zero or negative
– rates. This implies that (i) aggregate production and production in both intermediate
sectors grow at the same rate and (ii) expenditure shares, sectoral labor inputs and the
interest rate are constant over time (˙ ˜ φ = ˙ LZ = ˙ r = 0).
For the BGP values of LZ and ˜ φ we get (see Appendix A2):
L∗
Z =
δ (1 + 2aρ)
δ + ˜ φ∗α +
1 − β
β
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2 (1 + 2aρ) − aαβ2δρ
 
+ a(α − δ)β(1 − β)ρ + aα2β2ρ (22)
where asterisks indicate variable values or growth rates along the BGP. The equilib-
rium input of labor into x-intermediates can be derived from (5) which implies
L∗





From the no-arbitrage conditions for the patent market follows that along the BGP the
following relations hold (see Appendix A2):
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8The growth rate of resource extraction along the BGP can be determined by ex-
pressing the aggregate demand for resources, (6), in growth rates and considering the
Keynes-Ramsey rule, (16). This gives
gR = −ρ. (26)
Diﬀerentiation of (2) conﬁrms that balanced growth requires consumption and the
production of x- and z-aggregates to grow at the same rate, i.e.
g∗
C = g∗
˜ X = g∗
˜ Z. (27)
Identical constant growth rates of ˜ X and ˜ Z together with (3) imply that the sectoral
expenditure shares, φ and 1−φ, as well as the relative expenditure share, ˜ φ, are constant
over time.
The condition that along the BGP aggregate production in both sectors has to grow
at the same rate carries important implications for research eﬀorts in equilibrium. Con-
sidering the production technologies for x and z, (4), as well as (26), the growth rates












m − (1 − δ)ρ. (29)
Proposition 1. Along the balanced growth path, research is biased towards the resource
intensive sector. If, e.g., the z-sector is more resource intensive (α > δ), g∗
m > g∗
n holds.
Proof. From (28), (29) and g∗
˜ X = g∗
˜ Z along the BGP follows straightforwardly that the
following relation holds:
g∗





This condition states that for balanced growth to be feasible, diﬀerences in resource
intensities between sectors have to be compensated by research. It can also easily be
seen that in case that sectors are identical, innovation rates along the BGP are the same
in the two sectors. If, however, sectors diﬀer with respect to resource intensities, more
research will be conducted in the sector that is more resource intensive.
While the aggregate productivity weighted amounts of goods produced in both sec-
tors, ˜ X and ˜ Z, grow at the same, potentially positive rate in equilibrium, the physical
amounts individual intermediates produced in either sector, x and z, decrease over time.
9Taking into account that labor shares are constant along the BGP, it follows from (4)
and gRi = gR = −ρ that
g∗
x = −(1 − α)ρ < 0 (31)
g∗
z = −(1 − δ)ρ < 0. (32)
The reduction in the produced amounts is due to the decreasing input of natural re-
sources. If the z-sector is more resource intensive than the x-sector, z falls faster than
x. As economic intuition suggests, it follows from (3) that the price ratio follows a time
path that is inverse to the development of quantities, i.e. prices in the more resource
intensive sector rise faster due to increasing resource prices.
















− (1 − δ)ρ. (33)
Overall, the sign of gC in (33) is ambiguous. Two forces determine whether long-term
development is sustainable (gC > 0): −(1 − α)ρ and −(1 − δ)ρ represent the negative










a reﬂect the growth stimulating eﬀects of research.
As to be expected, it follows from (19), (25) and (33) that consumption growth along
the BGP proﬁts from more productive research (dgC
da < 0) but suﬀers if impatience rises
(dgC
dρ < 0). With respect to changes in resources intensities, eﬀects are, however, less
clear. An increase in the productivity of resources (increase in α, resp. δ) induces on
the one hand a less severe drag on growth as resources are more productive, but on the
other hand causes a reallocation of labor away from research. The net eﬀect on growth
depends crucially on the productivity of research and the discount rate which determine
the willing to invest in research.
3.2 Stability
To check for the stability properties of the system, we derive the Jacobian of (17) and
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10Lemma 2. The system given by (17) and (18) is locally saddle-path stable for ν < 1.
Proof. It can be shown that
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with detD R 0 for ν R 1 and trD > 0 for ν > 1. In a two-dimensional system the trace
is equal to the sum of the eigenvalues (tr = EV1 + EV2) and the determinant is given
by their product, (det = EV1   EV2). Consequently, for det < 0 exactly one eigenvalue
is negative while det > 0 in combination with tr > 0 shows that both eigenvalues are
positive.
A unique and stable trajectory in case that one eigenvalue is negative while the
other is positive requires the system to contain one degree of freedom, i.e. given that
households initially choose the value of one variable, the second is determined by the
system. Considering the underlying model structure where the initial values of S0, n0
and m0 are given, one of the initial values of φ and LZ can be chosen by the household
while the other is then determined by the system.
The result that for ν < 1 the system is saddle-path stable corresponds to the recent
literature. We are able to show that it holds in the presence of sectoral heterogeneity
with an essential non-renewable resource.
3.3 Generalization of results
It can be shown that our results, regarding the existence of a BGP as well as its stability
properties, can be extended to economies in which sectors diﬀer with respect to research
productivity (an  = am) and/or gains of specialization (βx  = βz).
Let us shortly consider the case of additional heterogeneity with respect to the gains
of specialization. Recall that when sectors only diﬀer with respect to research intensities,
(30) describes how BGP research is aﬀected by sectoral heterogeneity. This equation








n = (α − δ)ρ (36)
with βx and βz representing the gains of specialization in sector x and z respectively.
Higher gains of specialization in the sector x (i.e. βz > βx) would therefore imply an
even stronger bias towards z-research.
Note that research productivities do not enter (30) and (36). Sectoral diﬀerences in
a aﬀect the labor input in each research sector as well as the allocation of labor between
11research and intermediates (and thereby the levels of gn and gm). They do, however,
not aﬀect the functional relationship between gn and gm.
4 Policy analysis
In Subsection 3.1 we have derived that growth depends on research eﬀort and resource
use. Growth eﬀects of policy can therefore stem from either higher innovation rates
and/or slower resource extraction. Yet, alternative policies not only diﬀer with respect
to the channels through which they aﬀect growth, but also with respect to their impact
on the sectoral structure.
In the following we consider diﬀerent types of policies that might constitute alterna-
tives for a policy maker. In this section we assume throughout that α > δ, i.e. that the
x-sector is less resource intensive. We check diﬀerent policies with respect to their ability
to foster growth, to slow down resource extraction and to aﬀect the sectoral structure
of the economy. We do not characterize optimal policies, but rather conduct a positive
analysis of policy interventions. Speciﬁcally we focus on the level and dynamics, i.e.
rising or falling instrument levels over time, of
• resource taxation (tax rate τ and its growth rate gτ)
• labor subsidization (subsidy rate sw and its growth rate gsw)
• diﬀerentiated research subsidization (sn and gsn, sm and gsm)
• diﬀerentiated provision of productive public goods (shares µx, resp. µz, of con-
sumption and growth rates gµx, resp. gµz).
The analysis of the policy instruments is conducted in two steps. First, the traditional
instruments, i.e. taxes and subsidies, are analyzed in Subsection 4.1 while the provision
of public goods is treated in the Subsection 4.2.
4.1 Policy analysis 1: Taxes and Subsidies
In the following we consider ad valorem taxes on the input of resources as well as uniform
subsidies on labor and diﬀerentiated subsidies on research. Research subsidies are in the
form of wage subsidies. Coupling research and labor subsidies therefore creates a two-fold
impact on research costs.
To clearly distinguish the eﬀects of each instrument, we assume in the following
that the government can balance its budget via lump-sum taxation or subsidization of
households. In this case, policies are not tied together by budgetary requirements and
each instrument can be analyzed independently.




δ (1 + 2aρ − a(g¯ sm + g¯ sn))



















D1 = β(α − δ)(ρδβ(¯ sm − 1) + g¯ τ(1 − β + ¯ smβδ)) − ¯ smδβ(1 − β)(g¯ sm − g¯ sn)
+2(1 − β)2g¯ sn (39)
D2 = −β(α − δ)(ραβ(¯ sn − 1) + g¯ τ(1 − β + ¯ snβα)) + ¯ snαβ(1 − β)(g¯ sm − g¯ sn)
+2(1 − β)2g¯ sm. (40)
For notational convenience we denote ¯ τ = 1 + τ, ¯ sw = 1 − sw and ¯ sn = 1 − srn. We
retrieve the no-policy BGP values of the two variables by setting ¯ sm = ¯ sn = 1 and
g¯ t = g¯ sm = g¯ sn = 0.



















Z + a(g¯ sm − ρ). (42)
For the BGP rate of resource extraction we get
g
p1∗
R = −(ρ + g¯ τ). (43)
By employing the above BGP relations we can now derive the comparative statics of the
diﬀerent policy instruments.
Proposition 2. If resource tax rates, τ, and labor subsidies, sw, are constant over time,
they have no impact on long-run growth, resource extraction and the relative sector share.
Research subsidies, sm and sn, aﬀect growth as well as the relative sector share even if

















5For the derivation of the underlying dynamic system, see Appendix B1.
13Tax rates and labor/research subsidy rates that change over time aﬀect long-run growth,




















































C as determined by (37), (38), (41),
(42) and (43) with respect to the policy variables yields either zero, or the expressions
displayed in Appendix B2.
Resource taxation only aﬀects long-run growth and sector structure if the rate of
taxation changes over time. A constant tax rate has no impact on the economy as
neither labor allocation nor resource extraction change. This result corresponds to the
literature on exhaustible resources, see e.g. Groth and Schou (2007).
A rising rate of resource taxation aﬀects growth via two channels. An increase in
taxation induces the speed of resource extraction to rise. The resulting negative eﬀect
on growth is naturally stronger in the more resource intensive sector. To compensate for
this stronger resource drag, labor is allocated towards research in this sector. However,
the resource extraction eﬀect dominates such that the overall eﬀect remains negative.
Also in intermediates production, labor is reallocated towards the more resource
intensive sector. Due to the tax induced faster increase of intermediates’ prices in z-
production, the value share of the z-sector rises which raises proﬁtability and thereby
attracts labor from the x-sector and lowers ˜ φ.
Labor subsidization has no eﬀect on growth and sector structure - neither via the level
of the subsidy rate nor through changes in the subsidization rate. The intuition is, that
as labor inputs in all sectors are equally aﬀected by the subsidy, no labor reallocation is
induced.
The level of research subsidy rates aﬀects the allocation of labor in our model as it
distorts the production cost ratio between intermediates production and research. So,
in contrast to the eﬀects found by Groth and Schou (2007) but in line with Grimaud
and Roug´ e (2003) we ﬁnd growth eﬀects of time invariant policy instruments in a model
with essential non-renewable resources. Research subsidies foster growth as they lead to
an internalization of spill-overs from knowledge accumulation.
14Yet, the positive growth eﬀect of the subsidy rate is, at least partially, overcompen-
sated by a direct negative growth eﬀect of the growth rate of sn, resp. sm. The economic
intuition behind this result follows from no-arbitrage considerations of investment in re-
search. Consider the no-arbitrage condition, (11), for which under research subsidization
Vi = aw¯ si
i , i = n,m and gVi = gw − gi + g¯ si hold. This gives for the x-sector






and equivalently for sector z. Comparing (46) to (11) shows that research subsidization
aﬀects the no-arbitrage condition via two channels: the level as well as the dynamics
of subsidy rates (recall that ¯ si = 1 − si and g¯ si < 0 ⇔ gsi > 0). On the one hand,
subsidization reduces research costs such that for any level of investment in R&D, more
patents can be produced. The induced increase in proﬁtability leads to more research
and therefore higher growth. This is the level eﬀect observable on the RHS of (46). On
the other hand, if subsidies increase over time, research in the future would be even
less costly and proﬁtability even higher. This induces investors to postpone investment
which lowers R&D and therefore aﬀects growth negatively. This is the growth eﬀect of
subsidization which can be seen on the LHS of (46). A policy maker whose aim is to
promote growth should therefore heavily subsidize early on and then reduce subsidization
over time. From (37) and (38) it can be seen, however, that as long as research subsidies
change over time the economy is not on a BGP.
Due to the sectoral heterogeneity of our economy we are able to study structural
eﬀects of policy. The direction in which research subsidies aﬀect the relative market share
depends on whether the more or less resource intensive sector is subsidized. Subsidies to
research in the less resource intensive sector (sn) induce the relative sector size of this
sector to decrease - and vice versa for the more resource intensive sector. The line of
reasoning is equivalent to the case of resource taxation presented above.
Research subsidization exerts no eﬀect on resource extraction in our model. Although
the interest rate and therefore the growth rate of the resource price change due to
subsidization, the rate of extraction remains unaltered as income and substitution eﬀects
of interest rate changes on the savings decision of households cancel.
4.2 Policy analysis 2: Productive public goods
As a second policy option we consider to foster sustainable development by ﬁnancing
activities that enhance the productivity of resources in either one or both sectors. The
productivity improvement can, for example, result from investing in the public provision
of sector speciﬁc infrastructure or fundamental productive knowledge.
15For simplicity we again assume that the ﬁnancial revenues necessary are generated
via lump-sum taxation. It is further assumed that the share of consumption used for
public good provision is equal to the amount of public goods Gk, k = x,z, produced
from this share, i.e. Gk = µkC, µk < 1. The dynamic system is derived in Appendix
C1.
From this system the new equilibrium values of the relative sector share and labor
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E1 = (1 − β(1 − δ))[β((1 − δ)αgµz − (1 − α)δgµz) + (α − δ)(αβ − 1)ρ]
E2 = (1 − β(1 − α))[β((1 − δ)αgµz − (1 − α)δgµz) + (α − δ)(δβ − 1)ρ].
Note that setting gµ = 0 does not replicate the no-policy equilibrium in this case. It can



























Z − aρ (50)
where the functional forms of (49) and (50) are identical to the equilibrium conditions
for g∗
C and L∗
m in the no policy scenario. For the BGP rate of resource extraction we get
g
p2∗
R = −ρ. (51)
Proposition 3. The provision of public goods raises growth independently of the level
of the consumption share devoted to productive public spending, µk, k = x,z.
Proof. For the positive eﬀect of public good provision on g
p2∗
C see Appendix D. This









For the economic intuition behind this result, consider the case in which the policy
maker provides public goods to the less resource intensive sector only. In this case, the
feed-back eﬀect of x-production on the provision of public goods is equivalent to a rise
16in x-sector productivity. This increase in productivity induces a slower increase of inter-
mediates’ prices in x-production which lowers proﬁtability and leads to a reallocation of
labor from x- to z-sector research. Due to the increase in z-sector research, growth rises.
In the x-sector, the reallocation of labor reduces research which aﬀects growth nega-
tively. But, in the aggregate this negative eﬀect is overcompensated by the productivity
increase due to public good provision.
For no-policy balanced growth (Subsection 3.1) we showed that in equilibrium the
diﬀerence in research activities between the two sectors is determined by (30). This
relation remained unperturbed by the taxes and subsidies considered in the previous
subsection as neither aﬀect production technologies directly. In the case of public good
provision, however, the productivity of intermediate goods’ production increases due to





























Comparing (30) and (52) shows that the gap between research in the two sectors
might in- or decrease due to productive public spending, depending on the model cali-
bration and policy rule.
Employing the BGP relations, (47) to (51), we get the comparative statics of the
diﬀerent policy instruments.
Proposition 4. A constant share of consumption devoted to productive public spending
µk, k = x,z, has no impact on long-run growth, resource extraction and the relative























dgµz > 0. (53)






C , as given by (47) to (51), with respect
to µk and gµk yields either zero or the expressions displayed in Appendix C2.
A constant share of consumption devoted to public goods only has a level eﬀect on
consumption but does not aﬀect growth. If, however, the share rises over time, this
aﬀects growth positively. The rising share of public goods provision lowers proﬁtability
in the respective sector which leads to a reallocation of labor the other sector. Due to the
increase in the research of this sector, growth rises. In the other sector, research eﬀorts
17decline, but in the aggregate the induced negative growth eﬀect is again overcompensated
by continuing productivity increases. The provision of public goods proves to be an
eﬀective tool to enhance growth and simultaneously induce sectoral change.
5 Conclusions
The paper derives the long-run consequences of sectoral heterogeneity when sectors diﬀer
with respect to resource use. We have shown that sector-speciﬁc research activities and
induced innovations are crucial for the dynamic behavior of the economy. Research has
to overcome the drag on growth that arises from rising resource scarcity. Moreover,
resource intensive sectors can only stay competitive if they succeed to conduct faster
research growth. According to our results, the markets provide the incentives that this
indeed happens. Consequently, along the balanced growth path, research growth is
higher in sectors that depend more on resources.
In the second part of the paper we analyzed the consequences of diﬀerent policies
aiming at fostering sectoral growth and sustainability, i.e. raising growth and lowering
resource extraction. First, we considered the implications of traditional policy instru-
ments: subsidies and taxes. It was shown that resource taxes only raise growth and
lower resource extraction if the tax rate decreases over time. Labor subsidies, however,
are allocation neutral in our model and do no generate any real eﬀects. Subsidies on
research activities proved to be more eﬀective, with the level of subsidy rates aﬀecting
growth positively – independent of which sector receives the subsidies. Structural eﬀects
of policy arise as the eﬀect of research subsidization on market shares depends on which
sector is subsidized. Subsidies to research in one sector induce the relative sector share
of this sector to decrease.
Secondly, we considered the provision of productive public goods as a possible means
to raise sectoral and overall growth. We showed that the introduction of public goods
aﬀects growth directly when public good provision is tied to overall consumption. In
this case, productivity in the sector in which public goods are provided rises and thereby
aﬀects growth as well as sector shares. Increasing the share of consumption devoted to
public goods over time, induces a further positive eﬀect on growth.
If, however, the share rises over time, this aﬀects growth positively. The rising
share of public goods provision lowers proﬁtability in the respective sector which leads
to a reallocation of labor the other sector. Due to the increase in the research of this
sector, growth rises. In the other sector, research eﬀorts decline, but in the aggregate
the induced negative growth eﬀect is again overcompensated by continuing productivity
increases. The provision of public goods proves to be an eﬀective tool to enhance growth
and simultaneously induce sectoral change.
18The present research could be extended by assuming that the two research sectors
are (incomplete) substitutes. In this case the asymmetry between, e.g., the provision of
public knowledge and a disproportionate investment in sector speciﬁc research would be
diﬀerent and eventually smaller. This could be modeled in terms of diﬀerent risks in the
two sectors, which, however, is left for future research.
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206 Appendix
A. No policy scenario
A1. Derivation of dynamic system
To derive the equation of motion for LZ, (17), substitute intermediates proﬁts, (7), into
the no-arbitrage condition for the patent market, (11), which gives
gVn = r − (1 − β)
˜ φ





The equilibrium condition for the research sector, (10), implies gVn = gw − gn. Sub-
stituting the latter as well as (10) into (54) and considering furthermore that from (5)
we know that C
w
1+˜ φ
˜ φ = LX
αβ gives













As (5) implies gw = gC − gLX + 1
1+˜ φg˜ φ and we have (16) from consumer optimization,
(55) can be rewritten as
gC − gLX +
1
1 + ˜ φ






From (5) we also know LX = α
δ
˜ φLZ which implies gLX = g˜ φ + gLZ. Employing these










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − gLZ. (57)










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − gLZ. (58)
Adding (57) to (58) and rearranging gives










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − 2ρ. (59)
By considering that from the equilibrium condition for the labor market, (9), it follows
that Ln + Lm = 1 − (1 + α
δ













(1 + 2aρ) −
˜ φ




21To get an expression for ˙ ˜ φ ﬁrst consider that from (3) and the production technologies
















Consideration of LX = α
δ



















Diﬀerentiating (62) with respect to time and expressing the resulting expression in
growth rates gives after substituting gn = Ln







(Ln − Lm) + (α − δ)(gLX − gRX). (63)
For the diﬀerence in the input of labor in the two types of R&D it follows from (57) and
(58) that






Furthermore, (5), (14) and (16) imply that gRX = 1
1+˜ φg˜ φ − ρ. By substituting this
relation as well as (64) into (66), we get
1
ν − 1







LZ + (α − δ)(gLX −
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ + ρ). (65)
Recalling gLX = g˜ φ + gLZ and (17) ﬁnally gives (18):



























A2. Balanced growth path
From (60) and (66) the BGP values of LZ and ˜ φ can be obtained by setting ˙ LZ = ˙ ˜ φ = 0
which gives (19) and (20). Considering furthermore that ˙ LZ = 0, we get the BGP labor
shares in the two research sectors, (24) and (25), from (57) and (58).
B. Policy analysis 1: subsidies and taxes
B1. Derivation of dynamic system
The policy maker can employ three types of instruments: resource taxes, research sub-
sidies and labor subsidies. The governmental budget constraint reads
τpRR = smwLm + snwLn + sww + T, sn,sm,sw < 1 (67)
22where τ, sn, sm denote the resource tax rate and the subsidy rates on x- and z-sector
research respectively. sw is the subsidy rate on labor. T denotes lump-sum taxation
or subsidization of households that balance the government’s budget at every point in
time.
The proﬁt function of the individual intermediate producer in the x-sector reads after
taxation and subsidization
Πxi = pxixi − ¯ τpRRxi − ¯ swwLxi (68)
and equivalent for producers in sector z. Please note that for notational convenience
we denote ¯ τ = 1 + τ and ¯ sw = 1 − sw. It is assumed that individual producers do not
take account of the eﬀect of their production on public good provision, such that the
modiﬁed ﬁrst-order conditions for labor and resource input are given by
Lxi = αβ
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
¯ sww
and Rxi = αβ
˜ φ




and ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are still equal to (7).
The research ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions in case of labor and research subsidies read
Πl = pVl˙ l − ¯ sl¯ swwLl, l = n,m (70)
where ¯ sl = 1 −sl and it is assumed that the research subsidy is paid on the basis of the
wage bill after labor subsidization. In equilibrium the value of a patent has again to be





Proceeding as in Appendix A1 we get a modiﬁed system of diﬀerential equations that






















(g¯ sm + g¯ sn) −
˜ φ






































(α − δ) −
1 − β
β
(g¯ sm − g¯ sn) +
1
2
(α − δ)(g¯ sm + g¯ sn + 2g¯ τ)
 
(ν − 1)˜ φ. (73)
The BGP values of ˜ φ and LZ, (37) and (38), follow from (72) and (73) by considering
that along the balanced path g˜ φ = gLZ = 0. The system is again saddle-path stable for
ν < 1.
23B2. Comparative statics
Using the BGP values of ˜ φ, gR and gC we can derive the comparative statics results for
the three policy instruments where we denote6








As ¯ si = 1 − si, i = n,m, and ¯ τ = 1 + τ we get g¯ si = − si
1−sigsi and g¯ τ = τ
1+τgτ such that
d ¯ si
dsi = −1 and d¯ τ
dτ = 1 as well as
dg¯ si
dgsi
< 0 and dg¯ τ
























































β +(αsn+δsm) − 1
 















(1 − β)δ¯ sm













































(1−β)2(2(1−β)+β(α¯ sn+δ¯ sm))(−G1) which is



























Note that M = [(1 − β)(1 + 2aρ − 2ag¯ sn) − aβ(α − δ)(ρ + g¯ τ)] > 0, as claimed for
d ˜ φ
p1∗
dgsm < 0, can be proofed as follows: It was shown that G1 = aD1 −A < 0 for L
p1∗
Z > 0





B−aD2 > 0, this implies that also B − aD2 > 0. Now
it can be shown that
(A − aC) − (1 − β)M = −aβδ¯ smK (74)
(B − aD) − (1 − β)M = a(2(1 − β) + αβ¯ sn)K (75)
with K = ((1 − β)(g¯ sn − g¯ sm) + (α − δ)(g¯ τ + ρ)). As A − aD1 > 0 and B − aD2 > 0, it
follows from (74) and (75) that M < 0 is not feasible, as in this case RHSs of the above
two equations would have to be simultaneously positive.
C. Policy analysis 2: productive public goods
C1. Derivation of dynamic system
If public goods provided are provided to foster the productivity of resources, the modiﬁed
production function for xi and zj are given by
xi = Lα
xi(GxRxi)1−α and zj = Lδ
zj(GzRzj)1−δ. (76)
Considering that in equilibrium xi = x and zj = z hold, aggregate production of ˜ X and
˜ Z are
˜ X = n
1−β
β Lα




To endogenize C, express (2) in terms of ˜ X, resp. ˜ Z, only. Recall that ˜ Z = ˜ φ
ν
1−ν ˜ X
follows from (3), such that (2) reads
C =
 






1 + ˜ φ
  ν
ν−1 ˜ Z. (78)
Inserting (78) into (77) and rearranging gives
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˙ ˜ φ =
(ν − 1)(1 + ˜ φ)



















(α + δ) − αδ
 
(1 − ˜ φ) − (α






The BGP values of ˜ φ and LZ, (47) and (48), follow from (81) and (82) by considering
that along the balanced path g˜ φ = gLZ = 0. As in the policy scenario 1 and the no-policy
case, the system is saddle-path stable for ν < 1.
C2. Comparative statics






C , as given by (47) to (51), with respect to




= −(1 − α)δ
















= (1 − δ)α












(1 − β + δβ)H2 > 0
with
H1 = (δB − aE2)2 > 0
H2 =
aβ
(1 − β)((α + δ)(1 − β) + β(α2 + δ2)
> 0.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Due to the productivity eﬀect of public goods, labor inputs in x- and z-sector research
change as follows compared to the no-policy scenario (assuming that gµk = 0, k = x,z):
Lp2∗
n − L∗
n = (1 − β + δβ)Ω (83)
Lp2∗
m − L∗
m = −(1 − β + αβ)Ω (84)






i.e. a policy induced rise in Ln (resp. Lm) has to be accompanied by a decline of Lm
(resp. Ln).
Furthermore, public good provision modiﬁes the sectoral equilibrium growth rates



































m were unchanged compared to the no-policy scenario, this would imply
g∗
˜ X < g
p2
˜ X < g
p2
˜ Z where the relation g
p2
˜ X < g
p2
˜ Z is not compatible with BGP growth (see
(27)). Therefore (86) and (87) together with (85) imply that a post-policy BGP with
g ˜ X = g ˜ Z = gC can only be compatible with L
p2∗
n − L∗
n > 0 and L
p2∗
m − L∗
m < 0. From
(86) we see that this increase in Ln raises growth.
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